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Plato’s Laws on Correctness 
as the Standard of Art
Eugenio Benitez
New art is true art
The old masters slew art;
They all learned how to draw,
But they painted what they thought they saw,
Instead of what they saw they thought,
As a liberated artist ought.
—Whitelaw Savory (and Students), in Ogden Nash’s Opening 
Chorus for One Touch of Venus1
I. Introduction
Most readers of Plato’s dialogues would probably think of him as 
likely to approve more of the old masters than of new art. The old masters 
were on the whole far more realistic than modern painters—compare, say, 
Velázquez Innocent X (1650) with Matisse The Snail (1953)2—and Plato 
often seems to take issue with an artist if he departs even slightly from 
realism. A long section of the Ion, for example, is dedicated to showing that 
experts in charioteering, medicine, and other areas make the best judges 
about what poets say on those subjects, ostensibly because only experts 
can tell how realistically the poet represents chariots, medical treatments 
and the like.3 Even more telling is the view, famously expressed in the 
Republic, which suggests that painters should paint things according to 
what they actually look like: 
It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone approached and censured 
us, saying that we did not apply the most beautiful pigments to the most 
beautiful parts of the image, since the eyes, which are the most beautiful 
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part, have not been painted with purple but with black. We should think it 
a reasonable justiﬁcation to reply, don’t expect us, quaint friend, to paint 
the eyes so ﬁne that they will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts, but 
observe whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the whole 
beautiful. (420b, Shorey trans.)
Similarly the Critias demands “full and perfect resemblance 
(homoiotêtas)” in artistic reproductions:
[S]uppose we consider the ease or difﬁculty with which an artist’s 
portraiture of ﬁgures divine and human, respectively, produces the 
impression of satisfactory reproduction on the spectator. We shall observe 
that in the case of earth, mountains, rivers, woodland, the sky as a whole, 
and the several revolving bodies located in it, for one thing, the artist is 
always well content if he can reproduce them with some faint degree of 
resemblance, and, for another, that since our knowledge of such objects is 
never exact, we submit his design to no criticism or scrutiny, but acquiesce, 
in these cases, in a dim and deceptive outline. But when it is our own 
human form that the artist undertakes to depict, daily familiar observation 
makes us quick to detect shortcomings and we show ourselves severe critics 
of one who does not present us with full and perfect resemblance. (107b7-
d5, trans. Taylor)
 
In the Laws, Plato’s ﬁnal dialogue, the standard of correctness (orthotês) 
is applied to artistic productions. There it is said that a painting is ‘correct’ 
if it accurately reproduces the “quantity and quality” (tosouton kai toiouton, 
667d6-7; cf. hoson kai hoion, 668b7) of the original, so that the “equal is 
equal and the symmetrical is symmetrical” (ison ison ... to symmetron an eiê 
symmetron, 668a2-3), and so that the image has “all the parts and colours 
and shapes” (668e8-669a1) of the original.
Behind all of these passages lies the general idea, expressed as early as 
the Protagoras (312d3), and repeated often throughout Plato’s dialogues,4 
that painting is a matter of making likenesses (eikona), where the more exact 
the likeness is, the better. The conclusion that we are liable to draw is that 
Plato prefers realism in the arts, and that when he speaks of correctness 
in artistic productions, he has in mind something like accurate photo-
reproduction (or its equivalent in other media). 
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This paper is dedicated to arguing very nearly the opposite conclusion. 
I think that if Plato were to hear Ogden Nash’s lines from One Touch of 
Venus, he would respond with qualiﬁed approval of Whitelaw Savory’s 
criticism of the old masters. For the actual standard of correctness Plato 
commends has less to do with artists painting what they “think they see” 
(the unexamined content of sense perception)5 and much more to do with 
them painting what they “see they think” (the correctly visualised content 
of true understanding),6 if they can ever be brought around to doing 
that. In Plato’s aesthetics, correctness is only ever incidentally related 
to perceived likeness, and in many cases, “true art” would not involve 
anything like a photo-reproduction. 
I will be considering the standard of correctness as it is described in 
the Laws, but I think of Plato’s views there as clariﬁcation, not revision, 
of what he writes elsewhere. At the conclusion of this article I will return 
to the speeches just quoted from the Republic and Critias and show how 
my interpretation may be applied to them. First, however, I must discuss 
the meaning of orthotês with a view towards showing what counts as 
correctness in the argument of the Laws, and what kind of standard 
correctness is supposed to be. I will argue that correctness in art involves 
an isomorphic relation between expression and intentional object. When 
an artistic production accurately expresses the essential character of “what 
it wants to be”, then it is “correct”. Thus, correctness in art is, for Plato, a 
philosophical standard, concerned with “what really is”. Plato’s standard 
of art is neither purely aesthetic (since it is not about the perceptual 
qualities of an artistic production per se) nor purely moral (since, as I shall 
argue, to be correct in the required sense an artistic production does not 
have to depict anything good or even serious). Nevertheless, the failure 
of an artistic production to achieve correctness invites both personal and 
cultural criticism. For, setting technical hindrances of all kinds aside, when 
an artist makes “incorrect” art, it will always be a result of ignorance, 
which, for Plato, is blameworthy, both in artists themselves and in all 
who are taken-in by art. To this extent Plato’s standard of correctness is 
irreducibly value-laden.
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II. Correctness and Education in the Arts: Laws 642a-657b
The ancient Greek term orthotês is an abstract feminine noun based on 
the more primitive adjective form orthos meaning upright, straight, erect. The 
adjective can and regularly does have a strong evaluatively positive sense 
in its metaphorical uses, whether they are ethical (righteous, upright, just), 
epistemological (true, correct) or ontological (genuine, real). Forms based on 
the stem orth- occur frequently in the Laws, mostly in thematically innocent 
contexts.7 In concrete uses, the noun orthotês refers to upright posture, but is 
more frequently found in Plato in the metaphorical sense of uprightness or 
correctness. Used in this sense, orthotês always carries evaluatively positive 
signiﬁcance and is never remote from the metaphorical signiﬁcations 
of the adjective. Thus we shall have to consider at some point whether 
there are moral connotations to orthotês in the Laws,8 though a decision 
on that matter can be delayed until after we have examined its meaning 
as a standard for art. 
Orthotês ﬁrst appears in connection with art at Laws I.642a4, where 
the Athenian expresses the need for an account of mousikês orthotêtos 
(correctness of art or culture in general).9 Although nothing is here speciﬁed 
about correctness as a standard for artistic productions, this passage shows 
that the concept of correctness is thematic for the entire account of art and 
education in Book II. Importantly, it also highlights the ambiguity of the 
term orthotês, thereby indicating that there is no presupposed meaning of 
it already at work in the dialogue. The meaning of mousikês orthotêtos must 
be speciﬁed, as far as possible, in the investigation that follows.
The exact specification of mousikês orthotêtos does not follow 
immediately, however. As is common in Plato’s dialogues, the signiﬁcance 
of the term is allowed to build momentum before it becomes the focus of 
attention. For our purposes, there are three preliminary passages at the 
beginning of Book II that deserve consideration. None of these identiﬁes 
what it is for an artistic production to be correct, but all three passages 
help us to understanding the meaning of correctness in the Laws. The 
ﬁrst passage runs from 653a-655b, where the Athenian embarks on the 
subject of “correct education” (tên orthên paideian, 653a1). The second runs 
from 655c-656b, where the Athenian rejects the view of the many that the 
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“correctness of art” (mousikês orthotêta, 655d1) is determined by its power 
to produce pleasure. The third runs from 656c-657b, where the Athenian 
speaks about the regulation of art based on “intrinsic correctness” (tên 
orthotêta phusei, 657a8) and the difﬁculty in determining what such 
correctness is.
(1) Correct Education (653a-655b)
The Athenian says that “correct education” (tên orthên paideian, 653a1) 
is produced when feelings of pleasure and pain, love and hatred are 
engendered “correctly” in the soul (orthôs, 653b7), through “correctly” 
(orthôs, 653b7) training pleasures and pains, so that one hates the things 
one should hate and loves the things one should love.10 It is clear that at 
this point his interest is the correct development of ethical character, rather 
than of aesthetic judgment. But there is more built into the conception of 
“correct” here than merely what is evaluated as ethically right. There is 
an isomorphic relation between feelings and objects: hate correlates with 
hatables, love with lovables, and so on.11 This isomorphism is further 
developed in two subsequent speeches. 
In 654c-d, the Athenian describes the educated musician, the one who 
sings and dances well (kalôs, 654b7), as “rectiﬁed” (cf. kat-orthoi, 654d2) 
in pleasure and pain, because he is receptive to beautiful things (kala) 
and annoyed by those that are not beautiful (mê kala). The Athenian then 
says that if he and his interlocutors can discover what is beautiful (kalon) 
in singing and dancing, they will know what it means to be correctly 
educated (pepaideumenon ... orthôs, 654d6-7). 
Again, shortly after this, the Athenian asserts that, just as one can 
“correctly” (orthôs, 655a8) call the rhythms and harmonies of music 
“rhythmic” and “harmonious”12—ostensibly because there is an 
isomorphic correlation between these terms and their referents—one can 
“correctly” (orthôs, 655b1) refer to the movements of brave men as beautiful 
(kala) and those of cowardly men as shameful (aischra). 
In these two speeches the isomorphism of 653b is extended: the 
educated artist in general will hate hatables and love lovables, but now 
we are told that the lovables are beautiful things, and the hatables those 
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that are not beautiful, and further that virtue is among the beautiful things, 
while vice is among the ugly. Correct education in art, then, involves the 
correlation of pleasure, receptivity, and attraction with genuinely beautiful 
things, such as virtue, and the correlation of pain, disgust, and vexation 
with genuinely ugly things, such as vice. It appears that on this view of 
correctness, there could be art that is “bad” (in the sense of depicting 
bad things) but at the same time “correct” (in the sense of producing the 
appropriate correlative feelings in the spectator). We shall ﬁnd out more 
about that presently, but at the moment, we may at least conclude that 
whatever it is for art to be correct, it is not enough for a spectator merely 
to be pleased by it. 
(2) Correctness of Art (655c-656b)
The second of our preliminary passages looks more closely at the 
relation between art and pleasure. It shows how correctness in the sense 
of an isomorphic relation between feelings and objects helps to expose 
confusion in ordinary people’s views about art. According to the Athenian, 
most people say that correctness in art (mousikês orthotêta, 655d1) is a matter 
of the power it has to produce pleasure. The problem is, however, that the 
same art produces pleasure in some and pain in others. 
Obviously, there could be an enormous range of depictions in art that 
please people differently. The Athenian wonders about how to account 
for this variability. “Is it that beautiful things (kala) are not the same for 
all of us,” he wonders, “or rather that they are the same, but don’t seem 
(dokei) the same” (655c2-3). In view of what we have already learned about 
the rectiﬁed musician, whose feelings of pleasure and pain correlate with 
what is beautiful and what is ugly, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
variability among the many shows that they are not rectiﬁed. Speciﬁcally, 
because their pleasures and pains haven’t been properly calibrated, they 
opine things to be beautiful which are not beautiful. The verb dokeô at 655c3 
is signiﬁcant. In Ogden Nash’s terms, the many are pleased by what they 
think they see (since they think they see beauty), but they are not able to see 
what they think (i.e., they do not realise that what they think is false).
The passage continues to explore the consequences of art when 
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correctness, in the sense of an isomorphic relation between feelings and 
objects, is not attained. The Athenian discusses depictions of virtue and 
vice and their effect on unrectiﬁed people. The interlocutors agree that no 
one would actually say that depictions of vice are more beautiful (kalliona) 
than depictions of virtue, but they admit that some men secretly approve 
of, or are pleased by, depictions of vice. It is suggested that there are two 
ways of accounting for this: either those men have bad natural characters, 
but good upbringing, or they have good natural characters, but poor 
upbringing. Although it is not clearly spelled out, we may presume that 
in either case the good in them checks them from openly approving of 
vice, while the bad in them is at odds with this reticence.
The conception of correctness and incorrectness that is emerging so far 
applies only to the relation between spectators and artistic productions, 
and not to artistic productions in themselves. Art could depict good men 
as good, and bad men as bad, but still not be correctly appreciated by an 
unrectiﬁed public. The only productions that will be safe to expose all 
people to, then, will be depictions of good men and good deeds (cf. 660a6-
8).13 For it is necessary, stresses the Athenian, that every person will become 
like what he enjoys (656b1-7). Therefore, a person who is pleased by vice 
will be corrupted. But the rectiﬁcation of pleasures cannot be guaranteed 
for all citizens, because despite the best curriculum some people will have 
weak or defective natural characters. So censorship is required to protect 
those who are most susceptible to potentially corrupting art. This leads 
directly to the third of our preliminary passages.
(3) Intrinsic Correctness (656c-657b)
The isomorphic relation involved in correctness is, I think, fundamental 
to Plato’s theory of art and culture. It plays a decisive role in determining 
what art should be approved and what art censored in the city. An 
indication that this is so may be found in our third preliminary passage, 
running from 656c-657b. There the Athenian states:
[I]n the matter of music this inescapable fact deserves our attention: it 
has in fact proved feasible to take the kind of music that shows a natural 
correctness (tên orthotêta phusei, 657a8) and put it on a ﬁrm footing by 
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legislation. But it is the task of a god, or a man of god-like stature; in fact 
the Egyptians do say that the tunes that have been preserved for so long 
are the compositions of Isis. Consequently, as I said, if one could get even a 
rough idea of what constitutes correctness (tên orthotêta, 657b3) in matters 
musical, one ought to have no qualms about giving the whole subject 
systematic expression in the form of law. (657a3-b3, trans. Saunders)
Here we turn ﬁnally from attention to the correct match between 
the feelings of spectators and the objects they view, to the correctness 
that artistic productions may have “by nature” (phusei), that is to say, 
intrinsically. It seems that for Plato, education and censorship in the arts 
are both contingent on the discovery of what constitutes correctness 
for an artistic production itself. But notice that, though the two kinds 
of correctness may be analogous, correct experience of art is clearly a 
separate matter from the intrinsic correctness of art. If intrinsic correctness 
in art involves an isomorphic relation, it must be a different one from the 
relation between feelings and their correlative objects. This opens up the 
possibility that the moral and cultural applications of correctness involved 
in education and censorship may be distinct from the speciﬁcation of 
intrinsic correctness in art. The Athenian’s admission that discovering 
intrinsic correctness is a superhuman task suggests that it is a matter for 
philosophy.14 Accordingly, he must try his best to work it out, “in some 
way or other” (hopôsoun, 657b2). As we examine his attempt, we should 
bear in mind that the Athenian never claims to be a philosopher (he has 
arrived in Crete to assist in the establishment of a new colony, 702c), and 
his interlocutors are good but untrained (769b4-5); they have grown old 
in isolation from philosophy (643d, 897e) and are out of their depth in 
philosophical discussion (892d-893a).
III. Correctness in Art Speciﬁed: Laws 667b-679b
In Laws II.667b-669b, the Athenian presents an argument that 
speciﬁes correctness as the standard for evalaution in all the musical 
arts. The argument is logically messy and presents many difﬁculties 
of interpretation. I will therefore begin with a fairly detailed sketch, as 
follows:
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[1]  The most important (spoudaiotaton) thing about anything we 
ﬁnd charming is either: (a) charm (charis) itself, or (b) correctness 
(orthotêta), or (c) beneﬁt (ôphelian). (667b5-7)
[2]  One sort of charm is pleasure (hêdonê). (667b9)
[3]  In many pleasant activities, there is also some correctness or beneﬁt, 
e.g.:
 (a) in the case of food and drink, correctness lies in what is healthy 
(hugieinon). (667b8-c3)
 (b) in the case of learning, correctness lies in truth (as do beneﬁt, 
goodness and beauty). (667c5-7)
[4]  Likewise in the case of the imitative arts (tei tôn homoiôn ergasiai): 
when they succeed in producing genuine likenesses (eikastikai), there 
is pleasure; but there is also correctness in the sense of equality of 
quantity and quality (isotês ... tou te tosoutou kai tou toioutou). (667c9-
d7)
[5]  We correctly judge by pleasure only what produces neither beneﬁt 
nor truth nor similarity (mête tina ôphelian mête alêtheian mête 
homoiotêta). (667d9-e4)
[6]  Therefore, no imitation (mimêsin)—nor any proportionality 
(isotêta)—should be judged by pleasure. (667e10-668a1)
[7]  Equal is equal (ison ison) and symmetrical is symmetrical (summetron 
... summetron), not because someone thinks (dokei) it so, but because 
of truth. (668a1-4).
[8]  All art (mousikên) is representational and imitative (eikastikên te ... 
kai mimêtikên). (668a6)
[9]  Therefore, art is not to be judged, or pursued as important (hôs 
spoudaian), for pleasure. (668a9-b1)
[10]  Art that should be pursued as important is correct art (mousan ... 
orthê). (668b5-6)
[11]  Correctness obtains when the imitation renders complete the 
quantity and quality (hoson te kai hoion) [of the original]. (668b6-7)
[12]  Anyone who would not err about a poem must recognise (gignoskein) 
‘what it is’ (hoti pot’ esti); He must recognise its essence (ousian)—
what it wants to be and what it is really a likeness of (ti pote bouletai 
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kai hotou pot estin eikôn ontôs). (668c4-7)
[13]  Recognising the essence is necessary to determining the work’s 
correctness, which in turn is necessary to determining the goodness 
(to eu) of the accomplished work. (668c7-d2)
[14]  Therefore, anyone who would be a sensible critic whether in art, or 
in music, or in anything must recognise ﬁrst what it is (ho esti) he is 
judging, second how correctly (hôs orthôs), and third how well (hôs 
eu) it accomplishes its aim. (669a8-b1)
Two strands of this argument need to be separated out from our 
investigation of correctness. First, we can overlook the bogus standard 
of pleasure. There are some intriguing things said about pleasure and art 
in this argument,15 but they are clearly distinct from the speciﬁcation of 
correctness. Second, we need to detach the standard of beneﬁt from that of 
correctness. This is more difﬁcult, since the argument appears to depend 
on their fusion. For even though correctness and beneﬁt are introduced 
as distinct—beneﬁt is explicitly called a third thing (triton, 667b7)—they 
appear to be treated as a single standard in much of the argument (esp. 
[3], [5]). Thus, we ﬁnd phrases like “correctness-cum-beneﬁt” (orthotêta te 
kai ôphelian, 667c1; where te kai indicates an especially close association) 
and “correctness-or-beneﬁt” (tên orthotêta kai tên ôphelian, 667c5; where the 
parallel construction emphasises uniformity over distinctness). Moreover, 
a fused concept of correctness-cum-beneﬁt seems crucial to establishing 
that intrinsically correct art is important (spoudaion, cf. [1], [9], [10]), since 
there is nothing obviously important about similarity of, size, shape, 
colour, while there is prima facie importance in beneﬁt. 
I think that plausibly there is some confusion of correctness and beneﬁt 
in the course of the argument. Some of it may be resolved by noting that the 
Athenian has two goals simultaneously: the legislative goal of regulating 
art, and the philosophic goal of specifying what intrinsic correctness is. 
Most of the talk about judgment and serious pursuit of art ([5], [6], [9], [10]) 
is related to the legislative goal, while talk about what correctness is ([4], 
[7], [11]) is related to the philosophic goal. Regardless of any confusion, 
however, the Athenian does separate intrinsic correctness and beneﬁt 
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once again in [13] and [14]. There it is clear (although to eu is substituted 
for ôphelia), that understanding intrinsic correctness is necessary for 
determining or securing beneﬁt. Since that is consistent with the view 
expressed in our earlier, third preliminary passage, I will take it that this 
is the overall point about beneﬁt and correctness.
Let us focus, then, on what this argument tells us about intrinsic 
correctness in art. First, the examples used at the start of the argument 
[3a,b] remind us that correctness is a relational property. The healthy 
diet that the Athenian speaks of lies in a relation between nourishment 
and body. Nothing is said about whether this relation is assumed to be 
isomorphic, with a direct analogy between trophic and somatic properties, 
but Greek medical theory supports such an analogy.16 Similarly, the 
measure of correct learning, truth, involves a correlation between knowing 
and what is known. Here, clearly, the relation is isomorphic. Knowing 
(gignôskein) is correlated throughout the passage with what is (ti esti, ousia) 
by way of likeness ([12], [13], [14]).17
Next, the Athenian turns to correctness in the imitative arts ([4]-[8]). 
On one generally held account of Plato, he holds the naive view that 
art imitates originals by trying to copy them, shape for shape, colour for 
colour, proportion for proportion. At ﬁrst sight, that seems to be exactly 
the view of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws ([4], [7], [11]). He says that 
an imitation is correct if it reproduces the “quantity and quality” (tosouton 
kai toiouton, 667d6-7; cf. hoson kai hoion, 668b7) of the original, so that 
the “equal is equal and the symmetrical is symmetrical” (ison ison ... to 
symmetron an eiê symmetron, 668a2-3). In addition, the illustration he uses 
to make his meaning clear, seems obviously to have copying in mind. For 
the Stranger says that in a portrait of a man, it is important that the artist 
provide the image with “all the parts and colours and shapes” (668e8-
669a1) of the original. 
The illustration, however, is designed just to make plain the most 
basic idea of correctness in imitation. It deals with the most ordinary 
dime-a-dozen objects of sight (kata tên opsin hêmin apeikasiai muriai, 668d5). 
In fact, the remove from the musical arts (lyric, choral, tragic and comic 
productions) to painting involves a reduction from art of major cultural 
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importance to art of relatively little signiﬁcance for the Athenian. In 
important works of art and poetry, the primary target of mimêsis is “the 
beautiful” (tôi tou kalou mimêmati, 668b2). In such cases, the Athenian says, 
just copying an object is not sufﬁcient to create something beautiful, nor 
is recognising an accurate copy a sufﬁcient condition for determining 
whether it is beautiful (669a2-7). Since correctness of imitation is supposed 
to lead directly to beneﬁt and goodness and beauty (cf. tên de orthotêta 
kai tên ôphelian kai to eu kai to kalôs, 667c6-7), we cannot think of correct 
imitation as mere copying. This suggests a view about imitation that is 
more sophisticated than usually thought. 
We can get a better appreciation of just how sophisticated the view is 
by examining the correlation, explicitly brought out towards the end of 
the argument, of correctness with essence (ousia, ti esti). In order to judge 
a work of art, poetry or indeed anything, says the Athenian, the critic must 
ﬁrst know “what it is”. On the crude view of imitation as copying, knowing 
“what it is” refers to identifying an element in a picture or poem or other 
work. To use the Athenian’s own illustration, if a portrait is of a man, then 
knowing “what it is” is being able to identify that it is [a representation of] a 
man. Note that on this view, the painting of Pope Innocent X by Velazquez 
will seem more correct than the painting of a snail by Matisse, because 
it will be easy to identify the subject of the former as Pope Innocent X, 
while it will be difﬁcult, from sight alone, even to identify the subject of 
that latter as an animal, let alone a snail.
Clearly this is too simple. It is like treating a painting as a kind of mug 
shot, to be used merely for purposes of identiﬁcation. Even police have 
occasionally seen the ﬂaw in this. Between 1912 and 1930, Sydney police 
eschewed the stark, metrical style of typical identiﬁcation mug shots for 
portrait photography of criminals in natural light, natural dress, natural 
attitude. These photographs were recently exhibited in Sydney, where 
curator Peter Doyle remarked, “The photographers seem to have striven 
to record and reveal character and personal history as much as physical 
appearance.”18 In so doing, they aimed less at copying and more at trying 
to know their subjects.
Merely copying something is a matter of rendering what you think 
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you see. A painter might copy expertly the form of a woman generally 
regarded as beautiful, as Xenophon says the Athenian painters did when 
they ﬂocked to see Theodote.19 Let us imagine that one of them copies 
her exactly with all of the colours and shapes that appear to the eye, so 
that the painting becomes a marvel. Even so, according to the Athenian’s 
standard of correctness, the correctness of the painting cannot depend 
on what one thinks (dokei, 668a1) is beautiful, but rather on what beauty 
really is. If Theodote is not really beautiful (as Xenophon suggests), then 
the painting so depicting her is incorrect.
We can see, then, that the idea of painting as copying is far too simple 
to satisfy the standard of correctness described in the Laws. The Athenian 
may, for the sake of his aesthetically inexperienced interlocutors (769b4-5), 
illustrate knowing “what it is” by analogy with identifying a painted thing, 
but he is explicit that the task of one who would not err is to know, of each 
[whole] work, “what it is” (cf. kath’ hekaston ge ... tôn poiêmatôn, 667c4-5). 
There is clearly a difference between knowing the “what it is” of a work 
and identifying the “what it is” of an element in the work, even in the 
case where only a single element appears in a painting. To understand a 
painting of a man as a portrait is quite a different thing from identifying 
the object in the painting as a man. As soon as we understand this, we 
see Velazquez’s Innocent X as much more than a mug shot. Only when 
we understand this do we see Matisse’s Snail as art.
Paintings may be complex, with many individual elements organised 
into an overall unity. This is particularly true of Greek vase painting, which 
involved complex narratives. But poetry, especially epic and tragedy, could 
reasonably be said to be far more complex. The Iliad, for example, begins 
with “Rage” (Mênên) as its direct object—the goddess is asked to “Sing 
rage” (Mênên aeide, thea). If rage were the “what it is” of the Iliad, then the 
mimêsis of rage in its verse is not even possibly a matter of simple copying. 
The Iliad would be a very poor work if it were just a series of accurate 
descriptions of angry Achilles. To show what rage really is, it must show 
what rage does to a man, how it affects his relationships, how it relates 
to his other emotions, and much more besides.
There is evidence in the Laws that the Athenian does intend knowing 
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“what it is” to be more than the simple identiﬁcation of a copied element 
in a work. For in the passage in which he speaks about knowing “what 
[a work] is” ([12] above), he glosses that as “what it wants and what it is 
really a likeness of” (ti pote bouletai kai hotou pot’ estin eikôn ontôs, 668c6). It 
is reasonable to assume that in speaking of “what it wants”, the Athenian 
is referring to the intention of the work,20 and in speaking of “what it is 
really a likeness of” he is referring to what Danto called its “aboutness”. 
Indeed, Danto’s view that “Works of art are representations, not necessarily 
in the old sense of resembling their subjects, but in the more extended sense 
that it is always legitimate to ask what they are about,”21 seems to be little 
more than a recapitulation of what the Athenian says in the Laws.
IV. Correctness as a Philosophical Standard
If this is a fair interpretation of the argument in Laws II.667-669, then 
Plato’s standard of art is not, as is sometimes thought, a moral standard. 
The intrinsic correctness of art is not at all determined by moral criteria, but 
by how perfectly the artwork represents what it is about. However, because 
so much art—and particularly poetry, choral works, and drama—deals 
with moral matters, the standard of correctness has immediate moral 
implications. And some of these implications depend on substantive 
philosophical views.
For example, suppose a ﬁlm-maker or a novelist successfully portrays 
evil characters in a seductive way. Many people think that Leni Riefenstahl 
did this with Hitler in Triumph des Willens, or that Georges Bataille did 
it with the ﬁctional characters Simone and Lord Edmund in Histoire de 
l’oeil. If it is the case that evil really is seductive, then this aspect of their 
productions will be intrinsically correct. Whether or not viewers or 
readers appreciate this is a separate matter, with its own separate moral 
implications. They might confuse seduction with good, something the 
Athenian would consider a mistake, but that would be their failing, not 
a failing of the artist. On the other hand, if an accurate understanding 
of evil shows that it is not genuinely seductive, then to make it appear 
so is an artistic failing. An enormous range of subtlety is available in 
between: a novelist could make evil appear apparently seductive but not 
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really so, and that might be correct. What this indicates, however, is the 
necessity of understanding both the nature of evil and what the novelist 
actually shows. Both of these are philosophical tasks, about which there 
can be much discussion. Both involve seeing what you think, rather than 
merely identifying what you think you see. On this view, Plato’s standard 
of correctness, is a opening for philosophical discussion of the arts, not 
a bar for ruling out any particular content. All art that portrays good so 
that its goodness can be seen and appreciated, and evil so that its evil can 
be seen and ‘depreciated’, is correct art.
There is a caveat, however. On the theory of the Laws, the person who 
makes art, the actor who performs it, the critic, and the spectator, must all, 
in order to be safe, have a correct alignment between their feelings and the 
inner character of the subject matter. A person who feels disgust, perhaps, or 
shame (or both) at the sight of Goya’s Saturn Devouring his Children, or the 
conclusion of Luis Bunuel’s L’âge d’or is unlikely to be adversely affected 
by them. But someone who derives secret pleasure from them will. The 
Athenian insists that this correlation necessarily affects character:
Only presumably? Is not his case inevitably the same as that of one who 
views the evil characters of bad companions in real life not with disgust, 
but with enjoyment, condemning their actions in a playful fashion, like 
one not awake to their vileness (oneirôttôn autou tên mochthêrian)? In 
such a case it is, surely, inevitable that a man should grow like whatever he 
enjoys, whether good or bad, even though he may be ashamed to approve 
it. The result is absolutely inevitable--and what result could we call more 
momentous for good or evil? (656b1-7, trans. Taylor)
Here we can see that incorrect alignment of feeling with inner character 
is a result of ignorance. The person corrupted by evil companions is 
asleep, oblivious to the reality that surrounds him. Presumably, if he had 
an understanding of the inner character of his associates, he would revile 
them. As a second-best alternative, if he were habituated to feeling disgust 
towards such people, his interaction with them would be correct despite 
his lack of understanding.
Much of the Laws is about the establishment of institutions for 
achieving this second-best alternative. Out of abundant prudence, morally 
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ambiguous works are to be censored in favour of works portraying good 
men and good deeds:
In the same fashion a true lawgiver likewise will persuade, or if persuasion 
fails, will compel, the man of poetic gifts to compose as he ought, to employ 
his noble and ﬁne-ﬁled phrases to represent by their rhythms the bearing, 
and by their melodies the strains, of men who are pure, valiant, and, in a 
word, good. (660a4-8, trans. Taylor)
The conservative curriculum for the arts described in Book VII 
rigorously follows this advice. Poets will not be allowed to compose 
works that conﬂict with the city’s conventional wisdom (801d). Censors 
will judge compositions, accepting works based on good representation 
and rejecting works based on bad (812c). They will often recommend that 
compositions be revised. Importantly they will not defer to the poets’ 
pleasures and desires (hêdonais kai epithumiais), but to the more reasoned 
judgment of the lawgiver (802c). All of this is designed to base the selection 
of works on reasoned decision about their intrinsic correctness rather than 
on the emotional receptivities of an ignorant audience. Philosophy is to 
be the ultimate judge of correct art; as a second-best, law and time-tested 
tradition will do.
We might expect such a conservative society to produce an abundance 
of literary pap, of the sort found in Polonius’ advice to Laertes in “to thine 
own self be true” (Hamlet I.iii.59-80), rather than the sort of soul-searching, 
remorseful exposé of sexuality found in Nabokov’s Lolita. In fact, however, 
the Athenian is hopeful that philosophical works should replace more 
familiar genres (811c-812a), and that ultimately the serious pursuit of the 
ﬁnest and best life, which is philosophy, will be recognised as the most 
genuine tragedy (817b). Conservatism is a feature of the political and 
cultural theory of the Laws, not of its philosophical theory. 
V. Implications of Correctness for Plato’s Theory of Art
I said at the beginning that I would return to descriptions of art in 
the Republic and Critias, with a view towards explaining how they might 
be consistent with the standard of correctness described in the Laws. If 
I am right that intrinsic correctness in art is a matter of correspondence 
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between a production and the essential character of its object, then the 
descriptions in the Republic and Critias are misleading. Both passages seem 
quite straightforward, however.
The Republic informs us that it would be wrong to paint eyes purple 
on the isomorphic principle that the best parts should be painted with 
the best colours. Likewise, it would seem wrong to paint a green stripe 
down the middle of a face to arbitrate, say, between essential personality 
and public appearance. Rather, eyes should be painted to look like eyes, 
and faces should be painted to look like faces. Similarly, the Critias tells 
us that “daily familiar observation” is sufﬁcient ground to ﬁnd fault with 
a portrait that falls short of looking exactly like its subject.
Thus, these passages seem inconsistent with the view of correctness I 
have argued for in the Laws. But we need not take these passages so literally. 
They are, after all, offered as illustrations of more abstract points, just as 
the illustration of portraiture in the Laws was. In the Republic, the point 
of the illustration is to show the importance of a beautiful arrangement 
of the whole rather than the beautiful depiction of just one part. In the 
Critias, the point is to excuse the inexactness of Critias’ speech, by analogy 
with the inexactness we accept in scene painting, whose elements are 
relatively distant from us.
I think that both passages have been read too literally by aestheticians 
and critics of Plato. A more general appreciation of their import reveals 
elements consistent with the view of correctness in the Laws. For example, 
in the Republic, Socrates insists that in painting, pigments should be 
assigned which are proper to each element. So, perhaps, if the “what it 
is” of a painting is an eye it should be made to look like an eye. But if the 
“what it is” of the painting is an expression of the divide between inner 
and outer, a green stripe down the face might be exactly what is called 
for. It is the expression of the “what it is” of the whole work, after all, that 
is important. 
In the Critias, the main thing that is emphasised is that inexact 
knowledge correlates with inexact expression. But this is exactly what 
we would expect the theory of the Laws to tell us. What is needed is 
daily familiar observation with the subjects of one’s compositions. Only 
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by getting to know those subjects as they really are, will one be able to 
display them correctly. That is the work of philosophy.
Notes
1  “New Art is True Art” ll. 1-6, in Perelman, S. J. and Nash, Ogden, One Touch of Venus. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1944.
2  To avoid contention over the terms “old master” and “true art” I have used examples from artists 
explicitly named in these respective categories in One Touch of Venus. I have also chosen paintings 
that I think should be immediately familiar to readers, although admittedly the particular 
paintings chosen for comparison contrast far more than others that might be chosen.
3  See Ion 537-541.
4  See Republic 377e, 597e, Phaedrus, Theaetetus 144e, Sophist 235e, cf. 266d, Statesman 311e, Laws 667d. 
5  Indeed, Plato sometimes criticises artists when they paint things simply as they appear (whether 
to themselves or to others) rather than according to their essential character. See Republic 598b, 602 
ff.; Sophist 236a; cf. Theaetetus 208e.
6  I think it is likely that when Whitelaw Savory says that liberated artists painted “what they 
saw they thought” he means something much more subjective than Plato would like. Savory 
is probably referring to the expression of inward feelings and ideas. I doubt whether such 
subjective representation would gain much greater approval from Plato than realism. A strong 
reinterpretation of “saw they thought”, however, as “really saw the real objects of thought”, suits 
Plato much better.
7  The stem orth- occurs 367 times in the Laws, mostly (209) in the adverb orthôs and then next most 
frequently (118) in the adjective forms orthos, orthê, orthon, including comparative and superlative 
forms orthoteron and orthotaton. In many of these cases the use has no apparent thematic 
signiﬁcance (e.g. in the common response orthôs legeis). Nevertheless, there are exceptions, e.g. 
orthôs 653c7, 654d7, 655a8, 655b1, discussed below (see also orthos in the passage on dancing in 
Book VII.814-816). The verb forms diorthoô, epanorthoô, anorthoô, katorthoô, and exorthoô occur 19 
times (collectively), and among these epanorthoô, “to amend”, is the most frequently occurring 
(11). Epanorthoô is a particularly signiﬁcant term for Plato’s analogy between law and painting 
(VI.769-772), and, insofar as it describes the process by which a painting is improved according to 
a standard of correctness, is relevant to our investigation. But the discussion in Book VI involves 
too many additional issues to be treated here. Orthotês occurs 21 times in various forms, mostly in 
Book II (10), and there predominantly in the section between 655-670 (7), which is concerned with 
the standard of correctness in mimetic arts. Other occurrences of orthotês are widely distributed. 
See Laws I.627d3, 642a4; III.700e2; IV.721a7; V.733a6, 734d7; VII.80e1; VIII.841b6, 847e3, IX.853b6; 
XI.931b1.
8  Indeed, the ﬁrst occurrence of orthotês in the Laws (I.627d3), though not directly related to the 
subject of art, apparently does have ethical connotations. There, in discussing the paradoxical 
phrases “inferior to itself” (hêttôn autês) and “superior to itself” (kreittôn autês), the Athenian 
asserts that it is not for the sake of the gracefulness and ungracefulness of phrases (euschêmosunês 
te kai aschêmomusunês rhêmatôn) that they are investigating, but correctness and fault in regard 
to laws (orthotêtos te kai hamartias peri nomôn). It is interesting to note here that orthotês is actually 
contrasted with the aesthetic standard of grace and decorum, and associated with the ethical 
dimension of fault in hamartia.
9  The term mousikê comes closer to meaning ‘art’ than any other term in Plato; hence, I have tried 
to translate it as ‘art’ wherever possible. But there are places where the discussion is speciﬁcally 
about melody or harmony where the speciﬁc term ‘music’ is more appropriate. One must keep 
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in mind, however, that even where the term ‘musician’ is used, the person so described will have 
been educated in all forms of poetry as well as music and dance, i.e. not merely a musician in our 
sense.
10  The idea expressed here was clearly of great importance to Plato and the Academy. Indeed, 
Aristotle paraphrases it when introducing his account of moral habituation at Nicomachean Ethics 
II.3.1104b11-13: “Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very 
youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for 
this is the right education (hê orthê paideia)” (Trans. Ross). Although Aristotle departs from Plato’s 
terminology generally, he retains the crucial phrase hê orthê paidei for the correspondence of 
feelings and their proper objects.
11  Isomorphism seems to be implied in artistic correctness throughout the Laws. For example, 
correct music produces notes that are of the same pitch as the words being sung (812d), and 
correct dancing uses grand movements to represent graceful people, and unsightly movements to 
represent disreputable people (814e). Songs for men and women are to be composed differently 
to reﬂect the differences in their nature (802e), and even particular movements of the limbs 
in a dance should be isomorphically aligned to the character of the act performed (e.g. noble 
characters should be portrayed with straight posture, 815b).
12  Interestingly, he says that the chorus-master’s term “well coloured” (euchrôn, 655a7) is not applied 
correctly to harmonies and rhythms. Apparently, this is because in the terms “harmonious” and 
“rhythmic” there are isomorphic correlates to rhythm and harmony, but “well coloured” has 
no such correlation. The point is obscure, however. Is it because rhythm and harmony are two 
different things, so that “well coloured” couldn’t possible bear an isomorphic correlation to both? 
Or is it that the term “well coloured” is the wrong sort of term to correlate with harmony and 
rhythm?
13  In 660a, “composing correctly” (poiounta orthôs, 660a8) requires matching appropriate language, 
choreography and music to depictions of “temperate, brave, and completely good men” 
(sôphronôn te kai andreiôn kai pantôs agathôn andrôn, 660a6-7). 
14  In Plato’s later dialogues philosophers are regularly described as god-like men. See, for example, 
Sophist 216b-c, Philebus 33b (cf. 18b), Timaeus 90a-e (cf. 51e5-6, 53d6-7), Phaedrus 239c. 
15  The Athenian employs an obscure distinction between charm (charis) and pleasure (hêdonê). 
Careful reading reveals that ‘charm’ is always associated with adventitious delight (cf. 
sumparepetai). Any pleasure that accompanies, in an incidental way, some other value, such as 
correctness, or beneﬁt, or goodness, or nobility, can also be called charming. But there is a context 
where pleasure is not adventitious; in “free play” (paideian ge, 667e6) pleasure is the only thing 
aimed at. Such disinterested delight is merely pleasant, and is the criterion for aesthetic judgment 
in all cases where correctness or beneﬁt are not pertinent. Here there is an intriguing similarity 
of thinking between Plato and Kant. Both think that charm, or adventitious interest, cannot be a 
basis for aesthetic judgment, and both think that a certain kind of pleasure, and indeed play, do 
provide a basis for pure aesthetic judgment, namely that pleasure or play which is not connected 
to any interest. In the Laws, however, pure aesthetic judgment is deemed trivial, while it is of the 
greatest importance for Kant. See Critique of Judgement §§1-14.
16  It is interesting that the Athenian had already spoken about “correctly habituating” (orthôs 
ethizdôntai, 660a3) people to good diet, by preparing healthy foods with pleasant tastes and 
unhealthy foods with disgusting ones. Recall that this correlation of pleasure and pain with good 
and bad was precisely his aim in establishing the correct education.
17  See gignôskô, diagignôskô (668c4, c6, c8, d1, e4, e7; 669a3, a6, b1) in connection with esti, ousia 
(668c5, c6, c7; 668e1, e5; 669a9).
18 City of shadows: inner city crime & mayhem 1912-1948 was on at Justice & Police Museum, Sydney, 19 
November 2005-11 February 2007. 
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19 See Xenophon, Memorabilia III.11.
20 Bury actually translates ti pote bouletai as ‘what its intention is’; see R. G. Bury, trans., Plato X. Laws 
1-6, Harvard: 1926, p. 143. Note that the Athenian does not speak of the intention of the artist, but 
the intention of the work. The distinction between intentions of the work and intentions of the 
artist is an important one in contemporary aesthetics; see Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art 
(Princeton: 1984), p. 13.
21 Danto, Arthur. C, “Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art” in Humanities, 4 (1983), 1-2, 
paragraph 8. Notice that in speaking of “the old sense of resembling their subjects” Danto 
extends, to his own advantage, the common historical prejudice against traditional theories of 
mimêsis. 
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